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Possessing the knowledge to hedge energy price risks properly is essential and 
crucial for running a long-term business.  In the past, many hedging instruments 
have been invented and widely used. By using these derivatives, decision makers 
reduce the price risk to a certain degree.  
 
To apply these hedging instruments to the perfect hedging strategies correctly, it 
is necessary to be familiar with these tools in the first place. This work introduces the 
financial tools widely applied in hedging, including forward contracts, futures, swaps 
and options. It also introduces the hedging strategies used on energy hedging.  Since 
individuals are creating strategies according to their unique risk appetite and collected 
information, this work presents three risk appetites and a method of distinguishing 
valuable information.    
 
With the contribution of this thesis, future works can be done in the field that 
connect the information valuation and energy hedging by changing the behavior in 
each risk appetites’ hedging ratio.  
 
vii 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Abstract........................................................................................................................  vi  
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................  x  
List of Figures ..............................................................................................................  xi  
List of Tables ............................................................................................................  xii  
Chapter 1 – Introduction................................................................................................  1  
Chapter 2 - Hedging Instruments- Forwards, Futures, Swaps, and Options ..................  3  
 2.1 Forward Contracts.................................................................................................3 
  2.1.1 Basic of Forward Contracts...........................................................................4 
  2.1.2 Two Prices Associate with Forward..............................................................5 
  2.1.3 Cost of Carry ................................................................................................7 
  2.1.4 The Current Value of a Forward Contract .....................................................7 
 2.2 Futures..................................................................................................................8 
  2.2.1 Basic of Futures Contracts ............................................................................8 
  2.2.2 The Futures Contract and the Margin Account ............................................ 10 
  2.2.3 .................................................................................................................... 11 
The Relation among Futures Prices, Spot Prices, and Forward Prices ............................ 11 
 2.3 Swaps ................................................................................................................. 13 
  2.3.1 Plain Vanilla Swap ..................................................................................... 13 
  i. Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swap....................................................................... 13 
  ii. Plain Vanilla Commodity Swap....................................................................... 14 
  2.3.2 Value of a Plain Vanilla Swap .................................................................... 16 
  i. Value of a Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swap...................................................... 16 
  ii. Value of a Plain Vanilla Commodity Swap...................................................... 16 
 2.4 Options ............................................................................................................... 17 
  2.4.1 Calls (Caps) ................................................................................................ 18 
  2.4.2 Puts (Floors) ............................................................................................... 18 
  2.4.3 The Option Premium .................................................................................. 19 
Chapter 3 – Hedging Strategies ..................................................................................  21  
viii 
 3.1 The Perfect Hedge............................................................................................... 21 
 3.1.1 The Basic Risk that Effects the Perfect Hedge ............................................ 22 
 3.2 The Optimal Hedge............................................................................................. 23 
  3.2.1 The Minimum-Variance Hedge ................................................................. 24 
  3.2.2 The Proof of the Minimum-Variance Hedge ............................................... 24 
  3.2.3 Optimal Mean-Variance Hedge Ratio ......................................................... 26 
 3.4 Hedging Nonlinear Risk...................................................................................... 28 
Chapter 4- Utility Functions and Value of Information ..............................................  31  
 4.1 Utility Functions ................................................................................................. 31 
  4.1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 31 
  4.1.2 Utility Functions......................................................................................... 32 
  4.1.3 Three Types of Utility Functions ................................................................ 33 
  4.1.4 Common Types of Utility Functions ........................................................... 33 
 4.2 Value of Information .......................................................................................... 36 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 44 
Works Cited .................................................................................................................. 45 
Vita ............................................................................................................................ 49 
 
ix 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Commodity Futures Contract .......................................................... 8 
Table 2.2: Options Rights and Obligations..................................................... 19 
Table 3.1: The Specifications of Crude Oil .................................................... 27 
Table 4.1: Benefit Functions .......................................................................... 38 
Table 4.2: Information Structures................................................................... 39 
x 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Schematic of Proper Hedging Strategy ............................................ 2 
Figure 1.2: Electricity Producer Risk Profile ..................................................... 2 
Figure 2.1: Payoff of a Forward Contract .......................................................... 4 
Figure 2.2: The Transaction which Trades without the Exchange ...................... 9 
Figure 2.3: The Transaction made with the exchange ...................................... 10 
Figure 2.4: Convergence of Spot and Futures Prices........................................ 12 
Figure 2.5: Swap is an Agreement between Two Counterparties ..................... 14 
Figure 2.6: Periodic Payments of the Swaps.................................................... 14 
Figure 2.7: Purchasing Natural Gas from Spot Market .................................... 15 
Figure 2.8: Fixed Price Swap Hedged by a Power Company ........................... 15 
Figure 2.9: Call Options .................................................................................. 18 
Figure 2.10: Put Options ................................................................................... 18 
Figure 2.11: Option Premium Calculation Principles......................................... 19 
Figure 2.12: Call and Put Option Profit with the Commodity Spot Price ........... 20 
Figure 3.1: The Perfect Hedging Payout.......................................................... 22 
Figure 3.2: Demand for Crude Oil................................................................... 28 
Figure 4.1: Tpyes of Risk Appetite.................................................................. 31 
Figure 4.2: Power Utility Function .................................................................. 32 
Figure 4.3: Exponential Utility Function ......................................................... 32 
Figure 4.4: Logarithem Utility Function.......................................................... 34 
Figure 4.5: Quaratic Utility Function............................................................... 34 
Figure 4.6: Three Capital Lines depict the Possible Outcomes......................... 37 
Figure 4.7: Optimal Choices Upon Two Futur States....................................... 38 





   
Hedging activities have flourished among high energy consumers or producers, 
including oil and gas industry, airline, aluminum smelters, and electricity generators. 
For example, in the oil and gas industry, exploration and production projects are 
long-tenor and capital intensive.  Planning and controlling the price risk within the 
project duration is particularly important, because the risks affect the corporation 
operation profoundly. Failure to utilize such risk management tools is truly disastrous 
for an enterprise. 
 
Corporations are exposed to uncertainties regarding a variety of prices. Hedging 
refers to activities undertaken by the firm in order to mitigate the impact of these 
uncertainties on the value of the firm.  In a perfect capital market described by   
Modigliani and Miller (1958), in the absence of taxes, financial distress costs, 
contracting costs, and information costs, , there would almost be no justification for 
corporations to engage in hedging, including those strategies that use derivatives. 
However, in reality, because of the information asymmetry, market illiquidity, and 
social system; corporations need to hedge to avoid further undesirable risks not only 
for corporation value-enhancing but also for sustainable management.   
 
Today the modern financial services industry develops risk management via 
hedging strategies to manage volatile markets, especially the commodity market. To 
make one, collecting useful information is necessary.  A widely accepted method 
recognizes and evaluates the information in the monetary value.  Nevertheless, 
identical information is valued differently by individuals; this is because each 
individual has varying degrees of risk tolerance.  Thus, it is necessary to categorize 
individual risk type before we want to acquire the valuable information.   
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Figure 1.2 Electricity producers risk profile. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
HEDGING INSTRUMENTS 
 
The four main hedging tools are forwards, futures contracts, swaps, and options. 
And these derivatives play an important role in everyday commerce, since they 
provide effective tools for hedging risks involving the underlying variables. For an 
enterprise, the main uses of derivatives are minimizing the price risk, locking in the 
profits, and reducing the balance sheet volatility.  
 
 Derivatives, in broad definition, are securities whose payoffs (values) are related 
to other types of financial assets such as gold, crude oil, or security stocks. In practice, 
however, this broad definition is often restricted to securities whose payoffs are 
explicitly tied to the price of some other financial security. An example of such a 
derivative security is a certificate that can be redeemed in 6 months for an amount 
equal to the price, of a barrel of WTI. In fact, most real derivatives are fashioned to 
have important risk control features, allowing some players in a market to hedge their 
risk and others to take this potential profit-making opportunity to make money.  
 
2.1 Forward Contracts 
 
Forward contracts are simpler than, but closely related to, futures; it is a financial 
instrument which is a legal document, the terms of which bind the two parties 
involved to a specific transaction in the future.  
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Figure 2.1 Payoff of a forward contract (a) Long forwards (b) Short forward 
 
 
2.1.1 Basic of Forward Contract 
 
Forward contracts have been extended in modern times to include underlying 
assets other than physical commodities.  For example, many corporations use 
forward contracts on foreign currency, equities, interest rates, or commodities. 
Forward contracts for commodities have existed for thousands of years, for they are 
indeed a direct adjunct to commerce.  For both a commodity buying side and selling 
side, doing hedge is to lock the price risk.  When a forward contract is based on a 
commodity, it means the contract holder has the obligation to purchase or to sell the 
specific amount of a commodity at a specific price and at a specific time in the future.  
Every contract must have two parties, a buyer and a seller. A realistic example is an 
electricity company uses a forward contract to purchase 2,500 MMBtu of natural gas 
at 3.67 dollars per MMBtu on the 15th of March next year. In this case, there is no 
reference to a payoff, because there is only an obligation guaranteeing the purchase of 
natural gas.  In fact the payoff is implied; it will be determined by the price of natural 
gas in March next year. At the expiration day, if the price of natural gas is $4.67 per 
MMBtu, the contract would have $2500 profit from gaining $1.0 per MMBtu, and 
2500 MMBtu per contract. On the other hand, if the price goes down to $2.67 per 







MMBtu, the contract holder will lose $2500 per contract.   
 
Most forward contracts specify that all claims be settled at the defined future date 
(or dates); both parties must carry out their side of the agreement at that time. Almost 
always, the initial payment associated with a forward contract is zero; neither party 
pays any money to obtain the contract (although a security deposit is sometimes 
required of both parties). The forward price is the price that applies at delivery. This 
price is negotiated so that the initial payment is zero; that is, the value of the forward 
contract is zero when it is initiated.  
 
Opposite the forward market, an open market for immediate delivery of the 
underlying asset, is the spot market, because the forward market always trades 
contracts for future delivery. Since the spot market price may fluctuate during the 
period of a forward contract, although the initial value of a forward contract is zero, 






2.1.2 Two Prices Associate with Forward Contracts 
 
There are two prices or values associated with a forward contract.  The first is 
the forward price F, specified when a forward contract is written, which is the delivery 
price of a unit of the underlying asset to be delivered at a specific future date.  The 
second is the current value of the forward contract denoted by f.  Initially there 
should be no money exchanged when a contract agreement is completed; the forward 
price F is determined at time 0 at f = 0.  However, the value f may change from time 
to time; it depends on variations of the spot price of the underlying asset.  
 
Before we analyze the theoretical initial forward price F, some assumptions 
should be made such as no transaction costs, no storage cost, availability for short 
selling, and arbitrary division of assets. Based on the assumptions, equality exists 
between the spot price and the forward price. It is assumed that the spot price of the 
underlying is S and the price of a forward contract delivering at T is F.  One can sell 
one 1,000 bbl crude oil forward contract at F per barrel and buy 1,000 bbls crude oil 
at S per bbl from the spot market simultaneously. In this transaction, cash flows is 
(-1,000S, 1,000F), because one needs to pay in the spot market at time 0 and receive 
the F at time T.  One can reserve the crude initially to sell it at time T and assume d 
(0, T) is the discount factor between 0 and T. Thus, we can assert the relation between 
S and F is S = d (0, T) F, and when we use continuous compounded interest rate the 
discount factor becomes erT, and rTSeF = .   
 
Under the previous assumptions, no one can arbitrage via the operations; 
therefore, the netting cash flow must be zero. Otherwise, anyone can earn extra money 
from short selling in the spot market or buying in the spot market with the opposite 





2.1.3 Cost of Carry 
 
The previous examples and analysis are based on one important assumption, no 
transaction costs exist, which is unlike reality, especially in trading the commodity 
assets.  Generally, warehouses charge storage fees; thus, holding an asset costs extra 
money. Undoubtedly, these costs affect the forward prices.  Take a discrete-time 
model to illustrate the structure of forward price when cost of carry exists.  Suppose 
T is the forward expiration date, and T - 0 is in M monthly period.  The warehouse 
charges the monthly storage cost in c(k) per unit, and storage costs are paid in advance 
at the beginning of the month. The forward price is determined by the spot price, 
















F = Futures price expired at time T. 
c (k) = Storage cost at time k. 
d (i, j) = Discount factor, discount from j to i. 
S = Spot price of the forward contract underlying. 
 














2.1.4 The Current Value of a Forward Contract 
 
A forward contract holder may want to know his forward value on and go. The 
following is a method to achieve it.  Suppose a forward contract was written 
initially with a delivery price of F0, and the forward price which expires at time t is Ft. 
The current value ft can be derived by the difference times the discount factor. This 
value is given by the following statement: 
8 
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where  
d(t, T) = The risk-free discount factor over the period from t to T. 




Similar to the forward contract, futures contracts are legally binding standardized 
agreements on a regulated futures exchange.  The futures contract holder is to make 
or take delivery of a specified product at a fixed date in the future  at a price agreed 
on when the deal is made.  
 
2.2.1 Basic of Futures Contracts 
 
A futures contract is a standardized contract, buying or selling a stipulated 
quantity and quality, i.e. a certain grade at a set price on a given date in the future.  
Futures contracts are standardized trading via an exchange; it can be a physical 
delivery or cash settlement.  The exchange helps to define universal prices and 
insures the counterparty risk. Individuals do not desire to face the counterparty default 
risk, therefore an exchange as a middleman is in need.  Figure 2.2 and 2.3 are the 
comparison of two processes trading with an exchange and without an exchange.  
 
Table 2.1 Categorized commodity futures contracts. Commodity futures contracts can be divided 
into three categories: agricultural commodity, metals and energy trading in exchanges.  
 
 
Category Item of Futures The Exchange 
Agricultural 
Commodity (Food) 
Corn, Oats, Soybeans, Soybean meal, Wheat, 
Barley, Flaxseed, Canola, Rye, Cattle (feeder), 
Cattle (live), Hogs, Pork bellies, Cocoa, Coffee, 
Cotton, Orange juice, Sugar, Rice, Lumber 
 
CME, SAFEX.  
Metals  
and Energy 
Copper, Aluminum, Gold, Platinum, Palladium, 
Silver, Crude oil, Heating oil, Gas oil, Natural gas, 
Gasoline, Propane, CRB index, Electricity, Coal. 
 
CME, ICE, TOCOM, 
LME, DME, SGX, 




Figure 2.2 Transaction which trades without the exchange (Clearing house). Both sides contact 
their counterparty directly; therefore both parties encounter more risks if they choose 
trading via forward markets. 
 
 
As shown in Fig. 2.2, by trading without an exchange, such as trading via 
forward contracts, both sides have to face their counterparty default risk directly. 
Because of that, trading via forward contracts results in both the future price risk and 
the counterparty risk.  On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 2.3, in trading with an 
exchange, the clearinghouse becomes the direct counterparty for each side- the buyer 
or seller. The clearinghouse takes both counterparty default risk from doing the 
opposite position for both buyer and seller.  It has the obligation to fulfill the 
transactions no matter what happen in the other side.  For the long side (the buyer), 
the clearinghouse becomes the seller of the futures contract and vice versa.  At the 
delivery date, the clearinghouse will deliver the commodity to the long position side 
and receive the commodity from the short side (seller). Consequently, the 
clearinghouse’s position nets to zero.  The exchange marked-to-market both sides’ 











Figure 2.3 Trading with a clearinghouse (an exchange).  A decision maker takes less risk trading when 




The standardization of futures contracts formalizes the delivery dates, quantities 
per contract, quality (grade) of delivered goods, and even delivery locations. Because 
transaction makers take less time to build positions, these positions become more 
liquid and easier to book. For example, when trading a forward contract, the forward 
price changes constantly. If one does 10 sequence forward contracts, the position 
builder needs to monitor 10 different contracts thereafter.  The futures position terms 
and conditions can be the same in 10 successive trades; the value will be reflected in 
the margin account. Also, a trader can offset his futures position from the market.  
 
 
2.2.2 The Futures Contract and the Margin Account  
 
Futures is a zero sum game, meaning losses and gains com from both side net 
zero. One person’s loss constitutes another person’s gain.  For the exchange to 
guarantee the counterparty risk of each side to a minimum level, the margin account is 
needed.  The margin account adjusts its value from market conditions successively; 
this process is also called marking to market. There are two requirements of a margin 
account based on daily marked-to-market: initial margin requirements and 
maintenance margin requirements. If the value of a margin account goes below a 











margin requirement), a margin call is issued to the contract holder asking for 
additional margin. Otherwise the futures position will be closed out by taking an equal 
and opposite position.  Generally, the margin account is no interest, so some brokers 
will allow Treasury bills or other securities to composite the account holders’ interest. 
 
Here is an example of margin accounts.  Supposing one takes a long position 
(42,000 gallons, 1,000bbls) of heating oil in NYMEX for a March 2010 delivery at a 
price of $ 1.8866 (per gallon). And suppose the broker requires a margin of $800 with 
a maintenance margin of $600.The next day the price of this contract drops to $1.88 
and a loss comes out and amount is -$.0066×42,000 = -$277.20. The broker will take 
this amount from the margin account, leaving a balance of $522.80. Because $522.80 
is less than 600, the futures holder will be required to deposit $77.20 in his margin 
account; otherwise the position will be closed out, so that the contract holder will be 
forced to realize his loss. 
 
2.2.3 The relationship among Futures Prices, Forward Prices and Spot Prices 
 
This is the same concept as the forward price evaluation— a futures price is 
influenced by the cost of carry, interest, and spot price and the relationship between 
spot price and futures price is shown in Fig. 2.4.  The spot price of an asset 
converges to the futures price when the delivery date approaches, otherwise the 
arbitrage opportunity exists.  For example as of today, we all have an expected spot 
price of the certain underlying after certain period time, T. If inequality of the 
equation happens, FT ≠ E (ST), the arbitrage opportunity occurs.  For example, when 
there is an inequality, say, FT < E (ST), speculators can take advantage from long a 
position in futures market.  At time T, one can gain from buying that commodity at 
FT and selling the commodity at ST. The profit from this transaction is E(ST) - FT. This 






Figure 2.4 Convergence of spot and futures prices.  
The futures price converges to the spot price  
as time approaches the delivery date. 
 
 
The futures price should be identical with the forward prices. Nevertheless, these 
two prices are not always the same; the difference between the prices reflects the 
unmatched cash flows, counter-party risks, liquidity and so forth. On the other hand, 









A swap is an agreement between two parties, both to pay and receive the cash 
flows at several specified points in the future. It is called swap for ones payment 
because one is based on the average floating rate during the contract period and the 
other is based on a fixed rate when the deal is made. Swap is no physical delivery of 
the any underlying (commodity, equity, fixed income, or FX), normally is net cash 
settlement.  The amount of payment is determined by the agreed terms and 
conditions. The most typical incentive for the decision maker is to transform the cash 
flow stream into another type. When traders negotiate the swap, they focus on: 
 
! The fixed price 
! The floating price reference 
! Pricing period 
! Swap period (staring date or effective date, end date or termination date) 
! Agreement notional amount 
  
Because the swap can be applied to different markets such as FX, fixed income, 
commodity, and equity, the value of a swap is derived with regard to the underlying 
asset. Thus, it is a type of derivatives.  The most common is the plain vanilla swap in 
which one party swaps a series of fixed-level payments for a series of variable-level 
payments.  We will discuss the pricing methodology later. 
 
2.3.1 Plain vanilla interest rate swap 
i. Plain vanilla interest rate swap 
   
A plain vanilla swap is when one party receives fixed-level payments and pays a 
series of variable-level payments. This kind of swap can be regarded as a series of 
forward/ futures contracts and can be valued by the aggregation of a series of 
forward/futures. The following is an example of a plain vanilla interest rate swap. 
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Figure 2.5 Swap is an agreement between two counterparties.  
 
 
Figure 2.6 Periodic payments of the swap. 
 
Tenor:   3 years 
Notional Amount:  USD 10,000,000 
Payment:  Party A pays fixed rate at 3% p.a. and receives 3M USD LIBOR  
Payment Frequency: Quarterly 
1st Payment result: 
If the floating rate is fixed at 3.25%, party A needs to pay party  
B (3.25% - 3%) X USD 10,000,000/4 = 6,250. 
 
 
ii. Plain vanilla commodity swap 
 
Swaps are flexible and over-the-counter (OTC), they are tailor-made and 
customizable transactions, and swaps are financially settled and non-regulated. 
Therefore, swaps are uniquely suited for hedging applications.  These traits make 
swaps easily applied in energy hedging as well. The most frequently encountered type 






Periodic Fixed Payments 
Periodic Floating Payments 
Time 
Payments link to 3M LIBOR
Fixed rate payments 
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Assuming a power company generates power mainly from natural gas, for the 
most part, as shown in Fig. 2.7, it purchases natural gas from spot market paying the 
Inside FERC’s Gas Market Report (IFGMR) index for each MMBtu delivered.  This 
power company finds the volatility of the IFGMR index is too high and decides to 
hedge it from the fixed-price swap market.  In Fig. 2.8, the power company arranges 
a pay-fixed swap with a swap counterpart at the same time it pays the spot payment 
equivalents for the natural gas in the spot market.   This power company has 
eliminated the floating price risk by doing the swap. The net cash flow in each 
payment date is the fixed payment.  
 
 
Figure 2.7 Purchasing natural gas from the spot market. The power company normally pays the 






Figure 2.8 Fixed price swap hedge by a power company.  The power company buys natural gas on the spot 
market every month. The company arranges a swap with counterpart (or a swap dealer) to exchange 
fixed payments for spot price payments. The net effect is that the power company has eliminated the 
variability of its payments. 
 
Power Company Natural gas spot market 
IFGMR($/MMBtu)
Natural gas 
Power company Swap counterparty 
Natural gas spot market





2.3.2 Value of a Plain Vanilla Swap 
i. Value of a plain vanilla interest rate swap 
 
As in the example earlier, party A agrees to pay a series of semiannual fixed rate 
payments to party B on a notional principal. Party B pays back a series of quarterly 
payments based on a floating rate of interest (the example applies current 3-month 
LIBOR rate) on the same notional principal.  Swaps are usually net settled; only the 
difference of required payments is made by the party that owes the difference.  
Hence, the swap value can be acquired by summing up the difference during the 
agreement period.  For party A, the swap value is (F0 – r, F1 – r, F2 – r, …, FM – r) 
times the principal N.  The Fi’s are the floating rates. When summing up the stream 
of cash flows, for party A the swap can be seen as processing a floating rate bond and 
can sell a floating rate bond both of principal N and maturity M. Hence the overall 















V = Party A’s swap value. 
d(0,M)  = Discount factor from period M back to initial. 
r  = Fixed rate party A agreed to initially. 
N  = Notional amount of the swap. 
 
ii. Value of a plain vanilla commodity swap 
 
A plain vanilla commodity swap can be priced by simply totaling up the cash flows 
in every payment date.  Consider an agreement where party A receives spot price for 
N units of natural gas each period.  The net cash flow for this agreement is paying a 
fixed amount X per unit received Si for N units for M period is (S1 - X, S2 - X, S3 - X,…., 
SM - X) multiplied by the number of units N.  We get the value of a commodity swap 







−=∑ =                        
Where  
17 
d(0, i) = Discount factor at time zero for cash received at i. 
Si  = The spot price for commodity at time i. 
X  = The fixed price paid for the commodity swap. 
N = Number units for the commodity swap. 
 
Generally, X is chosen to make the swap value zero, so that both parties pay 




Unlike the owners of forwards, futures contracts or swaps, Options is an 
agreement between two parties that buyers only have rights but not obligations to 
exercise the option. Therefore, at the expiration date, if the market is against the 
option owner, he would not claim this option. On the other hand, the option seller has 
only the obligation to exercise the option when the option owner decides to exercise 
the option, and this only happens when the seller losses money. Options can apply to 
any asset from a specific futures contract called futures option, a swap called a 
swaption, or foreign exchange, fixed income, commodity…etc. 
 
2.4.1 Calls (Caps) 
 
Buyers of call options have the right but no obligation to buy the underlying 
commodity at the specific price, also called the strike price or exercise price, from the 
call option sellers. Because an option buyer would decide whether to exercise the 
option, the downside risk he faces is the premium paid. A call option buyer purchases 
calls only when he thinks the underlying commodity will go up at or before the expiry 
date. A call option seller sells one’s call option right when he thinks the market will go 
down or run steady before or at the expiration date, so that he can earn the 




Figure 2.9 Call options. (a) A call option holder has potentially unlimited gains when the commodity price is 
higher then strike price. Ones maximum loss is the premium the call option holder paid. (b) A call 
option seller has obligations but not the rights to exercise the option when buyer proposes to claim his 
rights. The best case scenario for a call option seller is gained from the premium he received.  
 
2.4.2 Puts (Floors) 
 
Call options owner always hope the spot price goes up, On the contrary, the holder of 
put options only gains when the underlying price is below the strike price. The owner 
has the rights but not the obligation to sell the underlying commodity at the exercise 




Figure 2.10 Put options. (a) A put option holder gains when the commodity price lower then strike price.and the 
maximum loss is the premium the option holder paid. (b) A put option seller has obligations but not 
rights to exercise the option when the buyer proposes to claim his rights. The best scenario for a call 








Strike price Spot Price Spot Price 
(a) (b)
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Table 2.2 Options rights and obligations 
 
2.4.3 Option Premium 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Option premium calculation principles. Option prices can compare with each other when 
these five factors are the same. 
 
Options Rights and Obligation 
Call  
Buyer Has the rights but not obligations to buy the underlying asset at a specific level 
before or at the expiration date.  
 Expectations: The underlying asset goes up. 
Seller Has the obligations but not rights to sell the underlying asset at a specific level 
before or at the expiration date.  
 Expectations: The underlying asset steady or goes down. 
Put  
Buyer Has the rights but not obligations to sell the underlying asset at a specific level 
before or at the expiration date.  
 Expectations: The underlying asset goes down. 
Seller Has the obligations but not right to buy the underlying asset at a specific level 
before or at the expiration date.  
 Expectations: The underlying asset steady or goes up. 
Option Premium
Time (T-t) 
Strike Price (K) 
Volatility (σ )
Interest Rate (r)
Spot Price (S) 
= Time Value + Intrinsic Value 
20 
 
Figure 2.12 Call and Put Options Profits with the Commodity Spot Price,  
 
An Option premium is the cost of the option; it consists of the intrinsic value and 
time value. The intrinsic value is minimum at zero and larger than zero when the 
option is in the money, meaning the option will earn money if the spot today remains 
the same until the expiration date. The time value goes higher as the tenor of the 
option gets longer; it is of value the option may bring higher profit.  
Strike price 
Spot Commodity Price 
Call Option Gains from 
Higher-than-strike-price 
Spot commodity price  








There are two types of hedging, blind hedge and selective hedge. Hedging 
merely with forward/futures contracts without further planning or quantity analysis is 
blind hedge; on the other hand, with attentive strategy, planning is selective hedge.   
The hedging strategies can be simple or complex; the futures contract is the most 
common derivatives contract eliminating risks for both blind hedge and selective 
hedge planners. We will illustrate varies hedging strategies later.  
 
3.1 The Perfect Hedge 
 
The simplest and most direct hedging strategy is the perfect hedge, where the 
risk associated with a future commitment to deliver or receive a certain asset can be 
completely offset by taking an equal and opposite position in one futures market or 
forward market. By taking the action of buying a forward/futures contract in the 
opposite direction, or locking in the price of the futures transaction; thus, there is 
absolutely no price risk. The obligation can only be fully hedged by this strategy when 
the futures or the forward contract is exactly the same as original position. 
 
A typical example of the perfect hedge is an oil company with an estimated 
annual capacity of 300,000 barrels of oil who has received a large order for delivery 
after three months at a specified price.  This company finds they can fully hedge 
their price risk by using WTI traded in NYMEX. They are planning to realize their 
commitment by exporting 100,000 barrels per month in the consecutive months. The 
oil company wants to stabilize their profit in advance and decides to hedge by shorting 
100 units of WTI futures each month in NYMEX. Assuming the cash flows match 
timely i.e. both positions will pay and receive the cash flows at the same time,   the 
net effect is that the oil company sells the oil of average of 3-month-WTI futures.  If 
we ignore the slight discrepancy between futures and forwards due to differences in 
cash flow timing, we can treat the futures contract just like a forward.  
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Figure 3.1 The hedged payout.  If the oil producer hedges via futures, his payout would become flat; if he 
doesn’t hedge, the payout goes up and down with time.  
 
3.1.1 The Basis Risk that Effects the Perfect Hedge 
 
Since basis is the difference between spot price of asset to be hedged and 
derivatives underlying price of contract used, basis risk is the risk that price 
differentiates from the hedged asset and the hedging asset. The follows types of basis 
risks:  
 
Location basis risk 
When the hedging derivatives underlying is delivered in the different geographic 
region to the physical underlying position, is called location basis risk.  In fact 
different location faced various supply/demand factors, such as political tension, grid 




Though the product is almost the same, say crude oil, the different quality of 
product cannot be substituted for the product in shortage; for example light sweet 
WTI and heavy sour Dubai. If one using Dubai futures hedges his light sweet crude 
Profit 
Commodity Spot Price 
Payout, No hedging 
Netting Payout, Hedged 
Futures Payout 
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oil, he will face this risk.(Table 3.1) 
  
Time basis 
Energy/commodity market is a high volatile market; it would be a catastrophe if 
the price shifts suddenly the large mismatch occurs.  
    
Mixed basis risk 
Of course, the mixed basis risk occur when an underlying position is hedged with 
more than one type of mismatch between underlying asset of hedged and the 
derivatives. And that hedge is void. 
 
Marker Crudes Origin/ Benchmark Quality Exchange 
West Texas Intermediate USA origin; global benchmark Light Sweet NYMEX 
Brent North West Europe, global 
benchmark 
Light Sweet ICE 
Dubai Middle East origin, Gulf 
benchmark 
Heavy Sour DME 
Tapis Malaysian origin; Asia Pacific 
benchmark 
Light Sweet --- 
Urals Estern Europe Origin; 
Mediterranean benchmark 
Heavy Sour  RTS 
Table 3.1 The specification of crude oil. 
 
 
3.2 Optimal Hedge 
 
 Because the criteria of doing a perfect hedge is not easy to achieve, one of the 
most main hedging related issues is the determination the optimal hedge ratio. 
Optimal hedge ratio is derived from optimized the hedging ratio by the particular 
objective functions, in which the minimum-variance hedging ratio is a widely used 
strategy (Ederington, 1979; Johnson, 1960; Myers & Thompson, 1989). However, the 
minimum-variance hedge ratio is based on decision maker whose risk appetite is 
extremely conservative.  Therefore, another hedging strategy, optimum 
mean-variance hedge ratio, is illustrated in this chapter.  In some situation that the 
24 
risk is nonlinear and can’t be reduced easily, this chapter also illustrates this risk in 
depth.  
 
3.2.1 The Minimum-Variance Hedge 
 
Though perfect hedge is easy and effective, the criteria to hedge perfectly with 
futures/forward contracts are strict and not always possible. It may be the mismatch 
from the delivery dates of the futures contract or the amount of the transaction is not 
divisible by the futures contract number. If the decision maker wants to hedge via 
forward contracts, he may find the forward contract is illiquid. It is not always 
possible to construct a perfect hedge with futures contracts. Therefore, most situations 
reduce the risks instead of eliminating it completely.  A widely used measurement of 
the degree hedging perfectly to the degree of imperfectness is the basis, defined as the 
mismatch between the spot and futures prices.  
 
Basis = spot price of asset to be hedged – futures price of contract used. 
 
According to the equation above, the best scenario is where the basis is zero at 
the delivery date. That means the asset price hedged is identical with price of the 
hedging instrument. However, this situation seldom happens for the reasons 
mentioned earlier.  Hence, alternative hedging techniques are required, one of which 
is minimum-variance hedge.  
 
3.2.2 The Proof of the Minimum-Variance Hedge 
 
In a world without transaction costs, e.g. interest rate, brokerage fee for margin 
account, supposed at time zero we would like to hedge our underlying asset by futures 
expired at time T. At time T we will receive the cash flow, y, consisting of x and 
hedging profit and loss. x presents the obligation to purchase W units at time T and it 
equals the spot price of the commodity times the units, WS. It is the spot price of an 
asset to be hedged at time T.  Let F denote the futures price of the contract that is 
used to hedge. There are two prices related from F, FT and F0 (indicating the futures 
price at time 0 and time T respectively). The overall net cash flow from the whole 
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position is y. Therefore, 
     
cash flow = y = x + (FT - F0)h. 
Where 
y  = The net cash flow at time T. 
FT  = Futures price at time T. 
F0  = Futures price at time 0. 
x  = The cash flow generated from original transaction equals WST.  
H = Hedging ratio using minimum-variance hedge method. 
 
To acquire the minimum-variance hedging ratio, we need to define the variance of the 
cash flow as 
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Because we want to find the h when the variance is minimized, this requires taking 













Fxh −=  
 
Using the minimum-variance hedging ratio h applies back to the original cash flow, 







Fxxy −= . 
[ ])(var)var( 0FFhxy T −+=
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When the X = WST,  
)( 0FFhWSy T −+=  
          ),cov(2)var()var()var( 22 TT FSWhFhSWy ++=  











FSWh −= . 







Therefore,        
Wh β−= . 
 
The minimum hedge is the best method when the perfect hedge is impossible. In 
fact, in some special occupations, the minimum-hedge can get the same result as the 
perfect hedge.  Supposing a futures commodity price will be identical to the spot 
commodity being hedged, FT = ST. The decision-maker has the obligation to buy W 
units of the commodity, so that X = WST.  In this situation, cov (x, FT) = cov (ST, FT) 
W = var (FT) W and we know that h = - W. Thus, var (y) = 0, there will be no 
difference when we use the perfect hedge and the minimum-variance hedge.  
 
3.2.3 Optimal Mean-Variance Hedge Ratio 
 
Viewing the hedging problem from a portfolio perspective is called the optimal 
hedge. An improvement over minimum-variance hedge is optimal mean-variance 
hedge, because it incorporated both risk and return in the derivatives of the hedge ratio. 
Mean-variance hedge ratio satisfies the expected utility maximization principle; 
however, this method is constrained the utility function to be quadratic.  Same as the 
minimum-variance hedge, assuming that cash flow from the portfolio is x at time T; 
and supposing that it will be hedged by futures contracts in the h contracts, the 
optimal hedging ratio could be acquired by the maximized the utility value of the 
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)]}.([{max 0FFhxUE Th −+=  
 
This approach fully accounts for the specific risk appetite described by quadratic 




)( xbxxU −= , 
with b > 0.  
Where  
b = The risk aversion parameter. 
x = The cash flow generated from original transaction equals WST. 
 
To acquire the optimal hedging ratio easier, we use another equation (close form) 
which is essentially equivalent to maximizing the expression 
 
)var()()( xrxExV −= . 
 
where  
V(x) =An altered mean-variance utility. 
r = Positive constant. 
 
In the most cases,   
       ).2/(1 xr =  
When x is applied by the final value of E(x), weights variance and one-half of [E(x)]2 
about equally. 
 
We applied the quadratic utility function into the expected value.  
{ )}.var()]([ 0 TT hFxrFFhxEMaximize +−−+            
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3.4 Hedging Nonlinear Risk 
 
In may be the case that the payout function is not changing along with the 
underlying price linearly. This happens in cases where the final wealth x was a linear 
function of an underlying market variable, e.g. the commodity price. Disappointingly, 
nonlinear risk cannot be hedged perfectly by derivatives, which we will illustrate it in 
this section.  
 
Nonlinear risk can arise in complex contracts as well; such as when a U.S. oil 
company is drafting a future agreement to sell crude oil to a Norwegian company in 
Kroner at a future date at a specified price. Since the U.S. firm takes a large foreign 
exchange price risk, both parties agree to share that risk if Norwegian Kroner (NK) 
appreciates or depreciates more that 10%. Below that level, the U.S firm alone would 
absorb the risk. To the U.S. firm, nonlinear risks also arise when the price of a good is 
influenced by other factors like the quantity being bought or sold, because oil prices 
change with the demand and supply instantaneously. When the oil supply in that 
month is a surplus, oil prices decline. In other words, production amount is another 




Figure 3.2 Demand for crude oil.  The price of crude oil varies from  
$100 to $0 per barrel, depending on the total quantity produced. 
 
 
As an oil product, summer production in Mexico Gulf depends on the weather. If 
no hurricane attacks during the season, it can drill oil in full-capacity. Otherwise, 
capacity depends on the number of days of attack and the strength of the hurricane. 
All produced oil is harvested simultaneously, and the price per barrel is determined by 
a market demand function, which is shown in Fig. 3.2. This demand function is  
P =100-D/100,000. 
where  
D = The demand amount among the crude oil market. Each oil producer will produce 
an amount of crude C which is not uniform.  
P = The crude market price under demand and supply equilibrium. 
  
Assuming that the amount of oil drilled on each field can vary, between 0 and 60,000 
barrels, with expected value C = 30,000 and there are a total of 100 fields, and thus 











 −==  
Where  
R = Revenue by selling crude oil. 








This shows that the revenue is a nonlinear function of the underlying uncertain 
variable C. This means, for the oil producer, its risk is not one factor but two factors. 
In other words, the oil producer faces nonlinear risk. 
 
In this complicate situation, the price is uncertain until oil has been produced; the oil 
producer only reduces partial risk by hedging with futures contracts when the 
producer can predict his production in the futures. Thus nonlinear risk cannot be 
reduced completely by plain vanilla derivatives.  
31 
CHAPTER 4 
UTILITY FUNCTIONS AND OPTIMAL HEDGING RATIO 
 
4.1 Utility Function 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 
Fundamentally, there are two ways to evaluate a random cash flow: (1) directly, 
using measures such as expected value and variance; and (2) indirectly, by reducing 
the flow to a combination of other flows which have already been evaluated. This 
chapter focuses on these two approaches, showing how they apply to single-period 
investment problems—and showing how they work together to produce strong and 
useful pricing relationships. 
 
4.1.2 Utility Functions 
 
The utility function will have two properties: (1) It will be order preserving. In 
other words if we measure the utility of x as greater than the utility of y, U(x) > U(y), 
it means that x is actually preferred to y. (2) Expected utility can be used to rank 





ii WUpWUE )()]([  
where 
W    = The amount of wealth. 
U (W) = The utility function of wealth amount. 
pi    = The probability of outcome in i event. 
 
Given the five axioms of rational investor behavior and the additional assumption 
that all investors always prefer more wealth to less, we can say that investors will 
always seek to maximize their expected utility of wealth.   In fact, the above 
equation is exactly what we mean by the theory of choice. All investors will use it as 
their objective function. In other words, they will seem to calculate the expected 
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utility of wealth for all possible alternative choices and then choose the outcome 
which maximizes their expected utility of wealth. 
 
4.1.3 Three Types of Utility Functions 
 
An important thing to keep in mind is that utility functions are specific to 
individuals. There is no way to compare one individual’s utility function to another’s.  
A useful way is to identify three simple utility functions which assume that more 
wealth is preferred to less, in other words, the marginal utility of wealth is positive 
(MU(W) > 0). If x and y are positive numbers, and x > y, then U(x) > U(y). In general, 
if the utility of expected wealth is greater than the expected utility of wealth, the 
individual will be risk averse. 
 
  
Figure 4.1 Three types of utility functions: Risk aversion, risk neutrality, risk seeking. If )],([)]([ WUEWEU > we 
have risk aversion. If )],([)]([ WUEWEU = we have risk neutrality. If )],([)]([ WUEWEU < we have 
risk seeking. 
 
If )],([)]([ WUEWEU >  the utility function is strictly concave, this is risk 
aversion. The decision maker will get more risk increased premium when taking one 
more unit of risk. If )],([)]([ WUEWEU = the utility function is linear, that is risk 
neutral which means the decision-maker will not get extra risk premium to take 
another unit of risky position. )],([)]([ WUEWEU < the utility is convex, this is risk 
seeking; among the players in the financial market, financial institution and hedge 
fund are risk seekers because they are so eager for return they ask for extra risk 





premium in turn.  
 
There is another method to differentiate risk appetite: supposing a man can make 
a choice, either making an investment which may receive x dollars or nothing in the 
future; nor keep his $ 100 in cash. Assuming the expected value of this investment is 
USD 100; the man who puts the money into uncertainty is a risk lover, the one who is 
indifferent to the two choices is risk neutral; and one who prefers keeping money in 
his pocket is a risk averter. 
 
4.1.4 The Common Types of Utility Functions 
Individuals possess specific utility functions, depending on their individual risk 
tolerance and individual financial condition. The simplest utility function is the linear 
utility function, U (W) = W. Except for the fact that utility is a function with the 
amount of wealth, this utility function is only for the risk neutral. Other types of 
utility function models acquire more condition to discern risk types.  The four most 




Figure 4.2 The power utility model.  Figure 4.3 The exponential utility model. 
 
W






i. Power Utility Function Model 
bbWWU =)(  
Where W = The amount of wealth, b is the parameter in charge of the degree of the 
concaveness, b > 0 is a risk lover, b = 0 is a risk neutral, and b < 0 is a risk averter 
(Fig. 4.2). 
 
ii. Exponential Utility Model 
aWeWU −−=)(  
An exponential utility model may come with a negative value when a > 0 as shown in 
Fig. 4.3; its value may be negative. Under this situation, exponential utility model is 
still reasonable, since the utility number itself is meaningless rather than a relative 
value.  Under the exponential utility model, U (W) is capped at 0 and the minimum 
value is where W equals to zero. 
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iii. Logarithmic Utility Model 
 
Figure 4.4 The logarithmic utility model.  
When the utility function is a 
logarithmic function, the utility 
value can be zero and the minimum 
value is ∞− . 
Figure 4.5 The quadratic utility model. 
The utility value increases as W, wealth amount, 




As Fig. 4.4, the Logarithmic utility function is  
)ln()( WWU = , 
it is the function of wealth amount. Under this model, negative values still appear 
even if the W > 0; at the point W = 0, the least value is ∞− . 
 
iv. Quadratic Utility Model 
2)( bWWWU −=  
Where b is the positive parameter of the utility function; the quadratic utility function 
only has meaning when b
W
>1 , because within this range, the utility is increasing as 













4.2 Value of Information 
 
One of the important notions of efficient capital markets depends on the quality 
of information and value of information. A message about likelihood over a period of 
time related to different events is defined as the information structure. The message 
has value to whomever (1) can react—take action, or change his/her previous decision 
based on the message, in other words, can change previous behavior and (2) will 
benefit in wealth or increased utility payoff from that reaction. Take an easy example, 
“the hurricane may attack Mexico Gulf within 7 days” only can be of value to the oil 
producers who have oil drillers in Mexico Gulf and are able to evacuate to prevent 
losses. For one who has invested nothing in that area or cannot withdraw his well 
equipments, that information is worthless.  A formal expression of the above concept 




eaUmepMAXmqV ),()|()()(η , 
 
where  
q(m)  = The marginal probability of receiving a message m. 
p(e|m) = The conditional probability of an event e given a message m. 
U(a,e) = The utility resulting from an action a if an event e occurs. We will call this a 
benefit function. 
 
According to the equation above, a decision-maker will evaluate an information 
structure, which considers all possible outcomes and possibilities and chooses an 
action which will maximize the expected utility given a received message.  For each 
possible message we can determine the optimal action. Mathematically, this process 




eaUmepMAX ),()|( . 
 
The final step of getting the information value is by weighting the expected 
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utility of each optimal action by using the probability, q(m); this is the probability that 
an action will be made when receiving the message mi. This way the decision maker 
knows the expected utility of the entire set of messages, which we call the expected 
utility (or utility value) of an information set, )(ηV . 
 
An Example of Value of Information 
The following example applies the value-of-information (VOI) concept to 
portfolio assets allocating. Assuming we can either put money in risk-free assets with 
an annual return of 3%, or invest money in the commodity market with an expected 
return of one of three possible results, 16%, or 10%, or -5% (as Figure 4.6), a 
decision–maker will build his portfolio in combination of two assets in a specific 
distribution. Assuming the standard deviation of the commodity market, mσ , is 
known with certainty.  
  
Figure 4.6 Three capital market lines depict the possible outcomes. Based on three possible returns and a 
known standard deviation, mσ , on the commodity market build three linear efficient sets (the capital 
market lines, CMLi). 
 





mσ CML1, e1 
CML3, e3,  
)( pRσ
CML2, e2,  
%10)( =mRE
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ones indifferent curve is tangent to the efficient set along the CMLi— each possible 
outcome.  In this example, the decision maker is a risk averter, because the utility 
curve slope is increased when one more unit risk is added. In other words, the investor 




Figure 4.7 Optimal choices for two future states, e1 or e3, of the world. 
 
Benefit Function 
From the formula mentioned earlier to calculate the value of an information, we 
need to establish the utility payoff function (benefit function), U(a,e).  U(a,e) is the 
utility function when taking a course of action, a, under an event or a state of the 
world, e, occurs.  Decision-maker can put the portfolio in a1 = portfolio 1, a2 = 
portfolio 2, and a3 = portfolio 3 in three states of the world by a particular market 
return: e3 =13%, e2 = 10%, and e1 = -5%.  
 
Presuming the commodity market return is 13%; a decision maker allocates 




Portfolio 1 Portfolio 3 mσ
e1 
e3 
U7 = 40 U4 = 25 U1 = 10 
)( pRσ
%13)( =mRE
 % in Rf % in Rm 
Portfolio 1 100 0 
Portfolio 3 30 70 
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expected, the utility payoff will be U7 = 40.  If an accident occurs, commodity return 
turns out to be -5%. However, the decision maker has already put money in portfolio 3; 
the utility payoff is where the utility curve tangents CML 1, U1, minus the 
disappointment, U4-U1,. Thus, the utility amount is U1-(U4-U1) = -5. 
 
Action e1 (Rm = -5%) e2 (Rm = 10%) e3 (Rm = 13%)
Portfolio 1 (action a1) U4 = 25 2U4 –U5 =20 2U4-U7 =10
Portfolio 2 (action a2) 2U2- U4 =15 U5 =30 2 U6- U7=26
Portfolio 3 (action a3) 2 U1 –U4 =-5 2 U3 –U5= 16 U7 = 40
Table 4.1 Benefit function U(a,e). 
 
Information Structure 
Information structure is another essential element for calculating the value of 
information; a Markov matrix gives the probability that an event will actually occur 
given that a particular message has been received. Obviously, two totally opposite 
cases are perfect information and no information. In table 4.1, a world with perfect 
information means the message predicts the result perfectly. This way the 
decision-maker always makes decision with maximum utility. And, information has its 
greatest value in a perfect information world. 
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2η  = perfect information 0η = no information 1η = noisy information 
 m1 m2 m3  m1 m2 m3  m1 m2 m3 








 e1 .6 .3 .1 








 e2 .2 .5 .3 








 e3 .2 .2 .6 
Table 4.2 Information structures. 
 
When regarding a received message providing the estimation probably of future 
states of the commodity market return, the decision maker will alter the original 
decision by choosing another action where he can maximize expected utility given 




Figure 4.8 Optimal actions given various states of world. 
 
 
Perfect Information, 2η  
In a perfect information world, when receiving m1, we know the state of the 
world e1 will obey with certainty.  As the result, we will take action under each 







Each message is given in even possibility q(m1) =1/3, q(m2) =1/3, and q(m3) =1/3. 








1)( 2 =++=ηV . 
Message Optimal action Utility 
m1 a1 (invest in portfolio 1) 25 
m2 a2 (invest in portfolio 2) 30 


















 % in Rf % in Rm 
Portfolio 1 100 0 
Portfolio 2 75 25 
Portfolio 3 30 70 
 
Cardinal Utilities
U1 = 10 
U2 = 20 
U3 = 23 
U4 = 25 
U5 = 30 
U6 = 33 
U7 = 40 
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To calculate the value of information, we need to transfer the utility into dollar 
amounts.  Assuming we have the utility function in 
)200$ln(10)( −= WWU . 
 
)200$)(ln(10667.31 2 −= ηW  
)200$)(ln(1667.3 2 −= ηW  
200$)(7290.23$ 2 −= ηW  
)(7290.223$ 2ηW=  
 
From the utility function, we derived the equivalent amount of wealth under perfect 
information world to be $223.7290.  
 
No Information, 0η  




. In other words, no matter which message we received, three states of future 
still happen equally.  
 
Since each message and future state are independent, the possibilities of 
outcomes are identical. Regardless of which message has been received, the 
decision-maker always takes a2 as his optimal decision because it generates the highest 
expected utility. 
 
If we take action  The expected utility is 








(10) = 18.33 


























1)( 0 =++=ηV . 
 
To convert the utility amount to the wealth amount:  
 
)200$ln(10)( −= WWU . 
)200$)(ln(1067.23 0 −= ηW  
)200$)(ln(367.2 0 −= ηW  
200$)(6653.10$ 0 −= ηW  
)(6653.210$ 0ηW=  
 
Using the utility value above, we can get the value of perfect information in the dollar 
amount to be 
1727.13$)()( 02 =− ηη WW . 
 
Noisy Information, 1η  
In the case of noisy information, messages received are random.  The 
preciseness of noisy information messages is in the middle of no information and 
perfect information.  For example, Table 4.2 shows when m1 is received, there is only 
60% probability that first state of world might be obtained; and 40% probability the 
message might be wrong, 20% in e2 and 20% in e3 state. According to the information 
structure, a decision-maker has three options (investing in portfolio 1, 2, or 3 
individually) when each received message and the expected utility is as followed: 
 






The decision-maker will take a1 as his action, because it has the largest expected 
If we take action  The expected utility is 
a1 (invest in portfolio 1)  .6 (25) + .2 (20) + .2 (10) = 21 
a2 (invest in portfolio 2)  .6 (14) + .2 (30) + .2 (26) = 20.2 


















As the result, the decision-maker would choose his optimal action when receiving 
each message as follows: 
 
If we receive  The optimal action is  With expected utility 
m1  a1   21 
m2  a2   24.4 








1)( 1 =++=ηV  
If the corresponding dollar value, for the ith individual, is 6697.211$)( 1 =ηW , then 
the noisy information value is 211.6697 - 210.6653 = 1.0044. 
 
If we take action  The expected utility is 
a1 (invest in portfolio 1)  .3 (25) + .5 (20) + .2 (10) = 18.5 
a2 (invest in portfolio 2)  .3 (14) + .5 (30) + .2 (26) = 24.4 
a3 (invest in portfolio 3)  .3 (-5) + .5 (16) + .2 (40) = 14.5 
If we take action  The expected utility is 
a1 (invest in portfolio 1)  .1 (25) + .3 (20) + .6 (10) = 18.5 
a2 (invest in portfolio 2)  .1 (14) + .3 (30) + .6 (26) = 26 




A seemly hedging strategy can’t be made arbitrarily, the decision maker must 
always put a lot of effort into it— collecting information, distinguishing valuable 
information, making decisions, and selecting suitable tools— which cost time and 
money.  
 
This thesis presents a review of hedging tools in energy futures, forward, swap, 
and option markets. It is intended to illustrate a beneficial method for decision 
markers to initiate a proper hedging strategy or an intuitive sense of how it works.  
This thesis begins with a review of basic tools for hedging and offers all the hedging 
strategies that can be used ranging from perfect hedging, to minimum-variance 
hedging and optimal hedging, to hedging the nonlinear risk.  As we know, the perfect 
hedge is the best, since it reduces the price risk completely.  Nevertheless, there are 
not many occasions on which the perfect hedge is applied, because there is not always 
a market exists of its restrictions and the rarity of the market or the underlying fitting. 
Finding the alternative is necessary for decision makers.  
 
The final part of the thesis reviews the three types of decision maker’s risk 
preference and the methods of valuing information. According to the precious 
information, recognized individual’s risk preference, hedging transactions should 
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